Harden backend against critical and high security vulnerabilities
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- Fix WebSocket CheckOrigin to use proper url.Parse instead of string stripping - Add admin auth checks to Users/User GraphQL queries - Remove GraphQL GET transport to prevent CSRF via cross-site links - Add application-level IP-based login rate limiting (5 attempts/min) - Add path traversal bounds check on radio file upload - Require DEV_MODE for GraphQL introspection and playground - Move notes backend endpoint behind admin middleware - Add dedicated Nginx rate limit zone for GraphQL (10r/s) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -226,6 +226,11 @@ func (store *Store) RefreshToken(ctx *gin.Context) {
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}
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func (store *Store) Login(ctx *gin.Context) {
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if !store.LoginLimiter.Allow(ctx.ClientIP()) {
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ctx.JSON(http.StatusTooManyRequests, gin.H{"error": "too many login attempts, please try again later"})
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return
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}
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var input UserCredentials
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if err := ctx.ShouldBindBodyWithJSON(&input); err != nil {
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ctx.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "invalid request body"})
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